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Review Article
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OF the numerous subjects preoccupying scholars within the ever-expanding field of immigration studies, few have attracted greater 
attention in recent years than the “securitization” of immigration.1 What 
is meant by this phrase? As interpreted by the Copenhagen School of 
security studies,2 securitization is said to be the process by which os-
tensibly nonsecurity issues, such as immigration, are transformed into 
urgent security concerns as a consequence of securitizing speech acts. 
Adherents of this school typically distinguish between “state security,” 
which is primarily concerned with territorial sovereignty, and “soci-
etal security,” which focuses on “the ability of a society to persist in its 
essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual 
threats.”3 The general process of securitization is said to commence 
*I wish to thank the anonymous reviewers for their insightful criticisms and practical suggestions.
1 See, for example, Adamson 2006; Aradau 2001; Bilgic 2013; Buonfino 2004; Burgess and 
Gutwirth 2011; Croft 2012; Diez and Squire 2008; Chebel d’Appollonia and Reich 2008; Chebel 
d’Appollonia and Reich 2010; Faist 2006; Freedman 2004; Ginsburg 2010; Guild 2009; Guild and 
Baldaccini 2006; Huysmans 2006; Kaya 2012; Ross 2004; Rudolph 2006; Tirman 2004; van Munster 
2009; and Watson 2009.
2 The Copenhagen School of security studies is a school of international relations theory inspired 
by Barry Buzan’s 1983 book, People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Re-
lations. Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde have also been prominent contributors to this school.
3 Wæver et al. 1993, 23.
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4 Wæver 1995, 46–86.
5 Lazaridis 2011, 2.
6 Wæver 1995, 54.
7 Balzacq 2005.
8 Hampshire and Saggar 2006.
whenever elite actors inject “low politics” public policy issues into the 
domain of “high politics” by adopting the rhetoric of existential threat.4 
In this context, Lazaridis describes the securitization of immigration 
as “a ‘top down’ process, in which various political, societal and secu-
rity elites present migration as [a] . . . threat to fundamental values 
of . . . societies and states.”5 Indeed, Wæver goes so far as to argue that 
“by definition something is a security problem when elites declare it to 
be so.”6 Although elite “securitizing moves”—that is, mostly premedi-
tated initiatives that usually take the form of rhetoric (for example, a 
speech, a report, or legislation)—must be supported by objective evi-
dence, the securitization process is ultimately intersubjective. Thus, in 
order for a securitizing actor to mobilize her/his target audience, the 
latter must accept the legitimacy of the former’s claims.7 If and once 
such claims are widely accepted as valid by the public, decision makers 
purportedly are then at liberty to transfer the affected issue out of the 
realms of conventional politics and policy-making and into the domain 
of emergency politics, where it can be expeditiously resolved.8 In this 
sense the securitization process is the antithesis of the methods and 
procedures by which elites normally seek the public’s support for their 
preferred policies.
 The four volumes reviewed here are among the latest contributions 
to a growing literature that applies securitization theory to the research 
area of immigration studies. As such, they represent four somewhat 
different and not altogether compatible research streams. The first, 
Lazaridis’s edited volume Security, Insecurity and Migration in Europe, 
mostly accepts the core assumptions of classic securitization theory 
as they have been applied to the contemporary politics of immigra-
tion. Among these assumptions are that security issues have ascended 
to unprecedented heights on the respective domestic and international 
agendas of Western governments since September 11; post–September 
11 political and policy-making elites have rhetorically associated im-
migrants with numerous cultural, economic, and physical safety threats 
and, in so doing, precipitated or inflamed widespread popular insecuri-
ties; and in a post–September 11 environment immigration-related is-
sues have been liberated from the established norms and rules of public 
policy-making, thereby facilitating the implementation of increasingly 
restrictive immigration and asylum measures.
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 A second stream, as represented by Chebel d’Appollonia’s Frontiers 
of Fear, adopts a broader view of the key dimensions of, and particularly 
the collateral damage precipitated by, the securitization of immigra-
tion in the United States and Europe. Although implicitly inspired by 
the core tenets of securitization theory, Frontiers of Fear nevertheless 
works within a historical, and hence a pre–September 11, framework. 
Central to her framework is the observation that elite and popular anxi-
eties about immigration’s negative effects predate September 11 and 
the subsequent terrorist attacks in Europe and, thus, immigration has 
long been “securitized.” Nevertheless, in an echo of classic securitiza-
tion theory, Chebel d’Appollonia (p. 8) argues that the aforementioned 
events have transformed otherwise reasonable immigration-related 
concerns into security fears, thereby precipitating a “security escalation.”
 Yet a third current, as reflected in Bourbeau’s Securitization of Immi-
gration, also accepts many of the central tenets of securitization theory 
as these have been applied to immigration politics and policy. However, 
in a departure from the orthodoxy that simply takes the securitization 
of immigration as a given, Bourbeau aspires to isolate and identify the 
empirical indicators of the phenomenon. Specifically, Bourbeau (p. 7) 
employs “a combination of indicators offering a nominal measurement, 
a degree measurement, and within-case analyses using two categories 
of indicators: institutional indicators and security practices indicators” 
in comparing the processes of securitization of immigration in Canada 
and France. This allows Bourbeau to conduct a systematic examination 
of the role of political elites, the media, and contextual factors in the 
process of securitization in those two countries.
Finally, a fourth stream in the recent literature is ambivalent and, oc-
casionally, skeptical about the purported causes, immediate effects, and 
long-term implications of the securitization of immigration. Although 
it largely assumes that public policy within the major immigration- 
receiving countries has been securitized, Immigration Policy and Security, 
coedited by Givens, Freeman, and Leal, nevertheless does not necessar-
ily or fully subscribe to the notion that securitization is a premeditated 
and sustained elite-driven strategy. Indeed, unlike the Lazaridis vol-
ume, tensions are evident among the contributors to Immigration Policy 
and Security between those who view September 11 as a critical turning 
point for the politics of immigration and the formulation and execution 
of state immigrant and immigration policy (Waslin) and those who are 
skeptical or guarded about its ultimate implications and practical effects 
(Boswell; Hampshire). Put somewhat differently, the volume’s diverse 
chapters straddle the boundary between accepting and contesting the 
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conclusion that contemporary immigration and immigrant policy has 
been securitized.
What has precipitated the securitization of immigration? The con-
sensus among scholars in the field, including most of the contribu-
tors to the collected works considered in this review article, is that the 
phenomenon is inextricably linked to the political and social conflicts 
precipitated by the arrival and permanent settlement of ethnically, cul-
turally, and/or religiously distinctive minority populations within the 
immigration-receiving countries. It concerns, in particular, the objec-
tive (for example, employment, housing, and welfare) and subjective 
(for example, cultural homogeneity, societal values, and/or national 
identity) challenges that immigrants pose for the policymakers and 
the so-called natives of these countries.9 According to Bigo, a lead-
ing voice of the Paris School of security studies,10 the securitization of 
immigration is fueled by three distinct but intersecting forces. First, 
politicians fear they are losing symbolic control over their country’s ter-
ritorial boundaries. Second, security professionals, with their socially 
learned dispositions, skills, and ways of acting, find themselves newly 
interested and invested in immigration matters. Finally, many alien-
ated citizens experience a sense of “unease” as a consequence of their 
inability to cope with the challenges and uncertainties of contemporary 
life.11 Although the practice of conflating immigration with security 
is often said to predate the events of September 11, 2001,12 a claim to 
which we will return below, most securitization of immigration scholars 
either implicitly or explicitly agree that the post–September 11 period is 
witness to a “‘problematization’ and ‘securitization’ of . . . [immigration] 
that is new in its scope and scale.”13 In short, September 11 is viewed as 
a critical juncture in and a major accelerant of the process of securitizing 
immigration in Europe and the United States.
Recent scholarship on the securitization of immigration has indeed 
been prolific and, on the basis of current trends, it will undoubtedly 
continue expanding. Nonetheless, within this expansive literature there 
has hitherto been little agreement on the scope or a specific definition 
of security as it pertains to immigration-related issues.14 Dissensus also 
9 See Alexseev 2005; and Bigo 2001.
10 In contrast to the Copenhagen School, the Paris School of security studies conceptualizes secu-
ritization not as a speech act but as a process of defining meaning through a technological as well as 
a technocratic discourse.
11 Bigo 2002.
12 See, for example, Weiner 1992–93.
13 Freedman 2004, 1.
14 Rudolph 2003.
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reigns with respect to the degree to which these issues have become 
securitized.15 On the one side are those, including most of the con-
tributors to the volumes under review, who argue that the conflation of 
immigration with terrorism and the framing of immigrants as societal 
“enemies” in public discourse has been ubiquitous across post–Septem-
ber 11 Europe and the United States and, consequently, unambigu-
ously signals the securitization of immigration.16 On the other side are 
those who reject the supposition that the concept of security has social 
aspects;17 protest that although immigration can be securitized, it is 
typically so to different degrees within and across countries;18 or deny 
that immigration-related issues have been securitized in political elite 
discourse and/or public policy.19
Against the backdrop of this debate and the significant “focusing 
event” of September 11—that is, an extraordinary event that dramati-
cally underscores the failure of policy, thus increasing its salience among 
decision makers and the general public20—this review essay asks in 
which specific ways and to what extent immigration-related issues have 
been securitized in the United States and Europe. In addressing these 
questions it will execute three tasks. First, it will critically assess the four 
major dimensions across which contemporary immigration purport-
edly is securitized: on one side, rhetorically addressing immigration-
related issues through political elite discourse, public opinion, and the 
mass media; and on the other, considering the policy processes through 
which immigration is purportedly securitized. Second, this article will 
identify the strengths and weaknesses of securitization theory as it has 
been applied to immigration. Finally, it will draw conclusions about 
the veracity of the central claims of the securitization of immigration 
literature and, specifically, its implicit causal story, a story that is said 
to unfold in the following manner within and across the immigration-
receiving countries:
precipitating focusing event(s) → strategically-motivated elite securitizing speech 
acts → public receptivity to securitizing speech acts → securitization of public policy / 
liberation from established rules and resolution of policy dilemma(s) outside of normal 
decision-making procedures → linkage between immigration and security is institu-





19 See Boswell 2007; and Schain 2008.
20 Birkland 1997.
21 See Croft 2012, 79–85; and Furuseth 2003, 18.
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In executing the aforementioned tasks, this article follows Bourbeau’s 
recommendation not to conflate the politicization of immigration with 
the securitization of immigration.22 As Bourbeau (p. 43) distinguishes 
between these concepts, the politicization of immigration extricates 
the subject from restricted networks and/or bureaucracies and injects 
it into the public arena; the securitization of immigration, by contrast, 
involves “integrating migration discursively and institutionally into se-
curity frameworks that emphasize policing and defense.” While the 
politicization of immigration is a neutral and an occasionally positive 
process, the securitization of immigration tends to be neither neutral 
nor constructive.
political elite discourse
There is probably no single “fact” on which most of the authors in 
the collected volumes under review and other securitization scholars 
explicitly agree other than that political elite discourse has securitized 
immigration-related issues in recent years, especially since September 
11. Although opinions diverge somewhat about the specific motives 
inspiring such discourse, the conventional wisdom is that numerous 
mainstream politicians and extreme right political actors have rhetori-
cally exploited September 11 and other terrorist-related events in a de-
liberate and calculated manner. As Phizacklea (p. 7) summarizes this 
perspective in her concluding remarks in Security, Insecurity and Mi-
gration in Europe: “In the face of an increased securitization-migration 
nexus (a securitization which becomes ever more elaborate technologi-
cally) migrants are cast as a cultural/criminal/terrorist threat and, in 
these recessionary times, a threat to economic stability.” According to 
Toğral (p. 219) in his contribution to the same volume, the elite-driven 
“‘war on terror’ has not only linked migration to terrorism, it has also 
consolidated the place of migration as a threat to cultural identity.” 
Hampshire (p. 118) further argues in his essay in Immigration Policy and 
Security that the “government-led securitization of migration . . . has 
been used to legitimize extra-ordinary policies, especially in the field 
of asylum and migrants’ rights.” Moreover, in Faist’s view, elites have 
elevated immigration to the status of a “meta-issue,” or an overarching 
concern in which the boundaries of immigration as an external and 
internal security threat have become substantially blurred.23
22 For an example of politicizing immigration-related issues, see Messina 1989, 126–49.
23 Faist 2002.
536 world politics 
 Given this general consensus, two critical and interrelated ques-
tions can be posed. First, is there concrete and compelling evidence 
that Western political elites have deliberately and systematically plotted 
to securitize immigration-related issues? Second, if elites indeed have 
attempted to securitize immigration-related issues, what are their pri-
mary motives?
 In response to the first question it is not unfair to conclude that most 
of the evidence of elite securitizing moves alluded to or presented in 
the collected volumes is anecdotal, episodic, unsystematically gathered, 
and/or difficult to compare across national cases. Moreover and more 
importantly, it is unclear if the aforementioned evidence, as scant as it 
is, supports the argument that elites have conducted a series of purpose-
ful and sustained campaigns to convince the general public that immi-
grants constitute an omnipresent security threat and one that requires 
the urgent implementation of extraordinary policy measures.
To be sure, and as chronicled in the works of Chebel d’Appollonia, 
Hampshire, Toğral, and others,24 political elite discourse about im-
migrants has often been inflammatory since September 11 and other, 
more recent terrorist events. There is no denying that numerous main-
stream politicians and extreme right political actors have rhetorically 
linked domestic terrorist-related incidents to mass immigration and 
immigrant settlement; illiberal, intolerant, and incendiary statements 
by such politicians are abundantly represented within the contempo-
rary public record across the major immigration-receiving countries. 
This said, not every contributor to the collected readings fully accepts 
the conventional wisdom, which suggests the existence of a pervasive, 
orchestrated, and sustained elite campaigns to securitize immigration. 
Boswell, for one, argues that “despite some initial attempts to link ter-
rorism and migration, political discourse on migration control . . . has 
remained surprisingly untouched by the anti-terrorist agenda.”25 Her 
analysis of post–September 11 elite discourse in Britain, Germany, and 
Spain leads her to conclude that, in contrast to the US, “discourse on 
migration control in Europe does not appear to have become securi-
tized as a result of 9/11 or the subsequent terrorist attacks in Madrid 
and London.”26 Perhaps even more persuasively, Bourbeau’s (p. 74) 
comprehensive catalog of the incidents when heads of state, heads of 
government, and interior and/or other relevant government cabinet 
24 See Chebel d’Appollonia 2012; Hampshire 2009; Toğral 2011; and the chapter contributions in 
Wodak and van Dijk 2000.
25 Boswell 2009, 93.
26 Boswell 2009, 105.
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ministers executed securitization moves in Canada and France between 
1989 and 2005 reveals that the securitizing speech acts of elites were 
sporadic: for example, despite the terrorist bombings in France in 1995 
as well as the events of September 11, 2001, France’s prime minister, 
Lionel Jospin, made no securitization moves during his tenure in of-
fice from 1997 through 2002; similarly, although 80 percent of all elite 
securitizing moves in the Canadian case postdate September 11, they 
nevertheless were not executed “on a systematic and repeated-over-time 
basis . . . [and] have remained relatively low since then.” In short, while 
it is all well and good to underscore that political elites can and occa-
sionally do make securitizing moves, it is quite another thing to assume, 
as securitization theorists often do, that such moves are calculated and/
or sustained over time.
With respect to their motives, the securitization of immigration lit-
erature generally assumes that Western politicians engage in discourses 
that frame immigrants as an existential, material, and/or physical threat 
for self-interested political reasons and/or in order to enhance the le-
gitimacy of their privileged position.27 As Boswell (in Givens, Freeman, 
and Leal, 94) describes this widely embraced perspective: “Securitiza-
tion legitimizes the state in its attempt to introduce more restrictive 
measures”; furthermore, it “provides an opportunity for consolidating 
categories of collective identification and helps mobilize support for the 
relevant political community, generating greater loyalty or patriotism 
through the definition of a common threat.” As mentioned above, it is 
frequently asserted that such securitizing discourse is consciously in-
tended to facilitate the transfer of immigration-related issues from the 
realm of conventional politics to that of emergency politics where they 
can be addressed and resolved outside of the normal policy-making 
procedures. As a result, it thus matters very much whether political 
elites act purposefully whenever they rhetorically link immigration to 
security, since in the absence of such evidence a central tenet of securiti-
zation theory—that is, focusing events inspire or facilitate strategically 
motivated elite securitizing speech acts—remains unproven.
What of the veracity of the claim that elite securitization discourse is 
primarily inspired by the aforementioned motives? The proponents of 
securitization theory in fact have not collected and/or presented much 
concrete evidence to support this thesis. Indeed, given its centrality to se-
curitization theory, it is conspicuous how few securitization of immigra-
tion scholars have made even the slightest effort to establish empirically, 
27 See Karyotis 2007; Tsoukala 2005.
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either through elite interviews or other data-collection methods, the 
motives that are assumed to drive elite securitization moves. Rather, in 
a classic example of argument by assertion many securitization scholars 
reflexively connect the fact of securitizing elite speech—that is, when-
ever it occurs—with the supposition that such speech is inspired by the 
ambition of elites to transfer immigration-related issues from the realm 
of conventional politics to that of emergency politics. In this context it 
is thus problematic that Bourbeau (p. 57) has discovered that the se-
curitizing speech acts of Canadian officials during the mid-1990s were 
primarily inspired by the rather mundane impulse to parrot the rhetoric 
of other Western officials and, thus, were not deliberately designed to 
extricate immigration issues from the normal policy formulation and 
policy-making procedures. Although the Canadian example could very 
well be an outlier, it nevertheless underscores the fact that there is a 
paucity of hard evidence within the securitization of immigration lit-
erature, including the volumes under review here, which links illiberal 
elite speech to the explicit motive of wishing to transfer immigration-
related issues to the realm of emergency politics.
Moreover, as is vividly underscored by the infamous 1968 “rivers of 
blood” speech by then British politician Enoch Powell and by then 
shadow prime minister Margaret Thatcher’s 1978 assertion that Britain 
“might be rather swamped by people of a different culture,” as well as nu-
merous other historical examples, securitizing moves by both mainstream 
and maverick politicians are hardly a recent phenomenon.28 Prominent 
examples of elites rhetorically linking immigration to security lit-
ter the history of post-WWII migration to Europe.29 Indeed, Chebel 
d’Appollonia (p. 6) traces this phenomenon even farther back in time, 
when she asserts that “the current framing of immigration as a terrorist 
threat employs traditional rhetorical arguments dating from the late 
nineteenth century.” Irrespective of its precise starting point, the stark 
reality is that for most of the past half century or longer a minority of 
European and American politicians has employed inflammatory rheto-
ric about matters of immigration and/or prescribed illiberal immigrant 
and immigration policies. On this score the post–September 11 period 
seems little different from either the distant or the more recent past.30
28 For examples from the British and French cases, see Freeman 1979, 280–307; and Messina 1989, 
103–49.
29 See Freedman 2004, 39–53; Givens 2005; Messina 2007, 54–96; and Thränhardt 1997.
30 Berkeley, Khan, and Ambikaipaker 2006.
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role and state of public opinion
As noted above, securitization of immigration scholars generally contend 
that elites employ existential threat rhetoric to extricate immigration-
related issues from the realm of normal politics and political discourse. 
Central to this project’s success is the public’s acceptance of the viola-
tion of rules that governments would otherwise be compelled to avoid 
in a nonsecuritized environment. Put differently, political elites who 
operate within a liberal democratic setting must garner the approval of 
a critical mass of the public in order to enact emergency measures to 
counter the purported threat(s) posed by immigration.
 Is there empirical evidence of such support? Have the securitizing 
speech acts of political elites persuaded either a majority or a large mi-
nority of the public that immigrants pose an economic, sociocultural, 
and/or physical safety threat? Regrettably, the securitization of immi-
gration literature—including the authors contributing to the collected 
works under review here—are mostly silent on these questions. Rela-
tively few securitization scholars have bothered to investigate whether 
the opinion survey record provides longitudinal evidence of such ac-
quiescence and, more importantly, whether the securitizing speech acts 
of elites (independent variable) have significantly influenced public at-
titudes (dependent variable). Indeed, if Karyotis is correct in assuming 
that “securitization [only] occurs when securitizing actors . . . succeed 
in convincing a relevant section of society that exceptional measures are 
needed in response to an existential threat,” then logically we should 
expect to discover two trends in the public opinion survey record.31 
First, there should be abundant and unambiguous evidence that either a 
large minority or a majority of the contemporary public perceives im-
migrants as an economic, sociocultural, and/or physical safety threat. 
Second, the data should reveal that whenever elites rhetorically associ-
ate, however tangentially, immigration with terrorism following a major 
domestic terrorist event, a greater percentage of the public becomes 
insecure about immigration and/or the presence of immigrants.
 As generally predicted by securitization theory, the shared experience 
of mass immigration has indeed precipitated popular insecurities across 
the immigration-receiving countries, including the public’s percep-
tions that immigrants negatively impact employment, national culture/ 
identity, and/or physical safety. Numerous studies beyond those reviewed 
31 Karyotis 2011a, 17.
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in this article confirm the thesis that a critical number of citizens within 
the affected countries are insecure about the presence of immigrants.32 
Although the foci of their insecurities vary across countries, and de-
spite differences of perspective among the various income groups, so-
cial classes, and so on within each country, a substantial minority to 
a majority of the public within the respective immigration-receiving 
countries are undeniably receptive to the illiberal oratory of political 
elites on immigration-related matters.
 Nevertheless, did September 11 and/or other terrorist events in Eu-
rope transform public opinion? More importantly, did the 1995 terror-
ist bombings in France, the attacks of September 11 in the US, the Ma-
drid train attack of March 2004, the assassination of Theo van Gogh 
by a Dutch-Moroccan Muslim in November 2004, and/or the London 
bombings of July 7, 2005, swell the ranks of those who feel especially 
threatened by immigration and settled immigrants? As might have 
been reasonably anticipated, and as correctly surmised by Likic-Brboric 
(p. 89) in Security, Insecurity and Migration in Europe, the disposition of 
national publics toward immigrants and immigration generally did not 
improve after September 11. Nevertheless, as Bourbeau has discovered 
in scrutinizing the available Canadian and French survey data, there is 
little if any evidence that public opinion was significantly transformed 
by the aforementioned trauma in either country. Instead, the survey 
evidence cited by Bourbeau (p. 118) “underscore[s] the enduring conti-
nuity in Canadian and French attitudes toward immigration.”
At least three other studies at least partially corroborate and expand 
upon Bourbeau’s findings. In their analysis of a Roper two-wave survey 
on popular attitudes toward Muslim religious rights taken before and 
after September 11 in Britain, France, and Germany, Fetzer and Soper, 
for example, discovered that although the events of September 11 in-
fluenced popular attitudes toward Muslims—that is, survey respon-
dents were somewhat less inclined soon after September 11 to favor 
the accommodation of Islam in state-run schools—most of the public 
in these countries nevertheless “did not become markedly anti-Islamic.” 
Moreover, Britons and Germans were “far more tolerant toward Islam 
than reports in the popular press might suggest.”33
In a second study Davis found that the disposition of Americans to 
acquiesce to the will of securitizing political authorities in the aftermath 
of September 11 was ephemeral.34 Informed by the results of several 
32 See, for example, Ederveen et al. 2004, 82–84.
33 Fetzer and Soper 2003, 256.
34 Davis 2007, 219.
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surveys he conducted after September 11, Davis concludes that the 
willingness of Americans to trade liberty for security after September 
11 was temporary and situational, eventually dissipating as the “reser-
voir” of political trust in the Bush administration eroded during the 
years following the attacks. As a result of his findings, Davis speculates 
that because Americans “now have the experience of anxiety and what 
might be expected when the government needs to provide for their 
safety and security,”35 any terrorist attacks perpetrated on American 
soil in the future will make the public less inclined to trade liberty for 
security than was true following September 11.
Finally, although executed seven years after September 11, a 2008 
German Marshall Fund survey discovered that a majority of respon-
dents in the US and six European countries rejected the premise that 
immigration increases the likelihood of a terrorist attack in their coun-
try: only 35 percent of Europeans and 40 percent of Americans viewed 
it as a possibility. French respondents were the most adamant, with less 
than a quarter (23 percent) linking immigration with terrorism.36
In sum, although it is not unreasonable to presume, as securitiza-
tion theorists have implicitly presumed, that more citizens would have 
become insecure about immigration and immigrants in the wake of 
September 11 and other, more recent acts of terrorism, there is no sur-
vey evidence indicating that this occurred.37 There are no longitudinal 
public opinion data to support the argument that elites have rhetori-
cally framed a “convenient linkage” between national security and im-
migration that, in turn, has been embraced by a wider public. If elites 
made deliberate securitization moves after September 11, these appear 
to have had little influence on public opinion over time, although they 
probably did result in immigration-related issues becoming more po-
litically salient.38
How can these counterintuitive findings be explained? Given the 
wealth of evidence that numerous political elites within the immigration-
receiving countries, especially leaders of extreme right political parties, 
did extensively engage in securitizing rhetoric after September 11, one 
plausible explanation for the null effect on public opinion is offered 
by Bourbeau. According to Bourbeau, for elite rhetoric to influence 
public opinion along the lines suggested by securitization theory, the 
relevant cultural and sociocultural contexts have to be favorable. Thus, 
35 Davis 2007, 224.
36 German Marshall Fund 2008, 8.
37 Messina 2012; Ross 2004.
38 Regarding this general phenomenon, see Zaller 1992, 36.
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whenever/wherever these contexts are unfavorable, elite attempts to se-
curitize immigration in the public mind are likely to fail and frequently 
do. Central to this explanation is Bourbeau’s supposition that different 
contexts across countries and changing contexts within countries over 
time significantly circumscribe the influence that aspirant securitizing 
actors can have on public opinion. As he explains:
Securitizing agents cannot exclude themselves from environments in which 
they formulate their securitizing attempts. . . . To be sure, agents do have some 
autonomy; socio-historically and culturally produced knowledge enables indi-
viduals to construct and give meaning to contextual factors. However . . . their 
capacity to change, reproduce, and remodel the security realm is not unbounded. 
A security speech act does not constitute a securitization; it represents only an 
attempt to present an issue as a security threat. (p. 98)
To illustrate, Bourbeau (pp. 110–18) points to the reticence of most 
Canadians, for reasons linked to Canada’s long history as a country of 
immigration and the conspicuous absence of immigration as a salient 
issue in national election campaigns, to perceive immigrants as an exis-
tential security threat, including after September 11. As a consequence 
of their reticence, he concludes, the potential for Canadian political 
elites to securitize immigration successfully was and continues to be 
significantly circumscribed, a finding that, while not necessarily appli-
cable universally, nevertheless probably applies elsewhere and especially 
to the traditional countries of immigration.
Another plausible explanation for the lack of a post–September 11 
effect—and one that can readily be applied across the relevant country 
cases—derives from insights generated within the general scholarly lit-
erature on public opinion. Within this literature Yankelovich observes 
that “public opinion develops slowly over a long period—at least 10 
years for a complex issue.”39 In doing so it winds through seven distinct 
stages, the last of which results in citizens endorsing a course of action, 
accepting its costs and trade-offs, and living with the consequences of 
their beliefs. Immigration, it could reasonably be presumed, is just such 
a complex and multifaceted issue. If so, it is probable that September 
11 had little if any influence on the trajectory of public opinion because 
the most disruptive and disturbing implications of mass immigration 
and immigrant settlement had long ago been factored into the think-
ing of most Europeans, and particularly those within the traditional 
immigration-receiving countries.40 Indeed, along these lines McLaren 
39 Yankelovich 1993, 1.
40 Messina 2012, 370–72.
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observes that popular “fears related to the religion and culture of new 
immigrants were apparent in Europe before the attacks of September 
11, July 7, and the Madrid train attack of 2004,” although her con-
clusion that these “incidents have heightened [the public’s] fears even 
further” seems to be contradicted by the above cited-survey evidence.41 
Sniderman and Hagendoorn similarly argue that the “strains between 
Muslims and West Europeans . . . were not a product of 11 September 
2001—quite the contrary, they provided the basis for reactions to it.”42
role of mass media
Bourbeau’s aforementioned argument that history and culture circum-
scribe attempts by elites to securitize immigration does not, of course, 
preclude the possibility that the latter will nevertheless try to mobilize 
popular support for their preferred policies. It is in this context that 
the securitization of immigration literature frequently characterizes the 
mass media as either implicit or explicit allies of political elites and, 
in any event, key intermediaries in the securitization process by pro-
viding a communication transmission belt between securitizing agents 
and their target audience.43 Within this literature “media frames,” in 
particular, are represented as lenses through which the public can either 
be persuaded to perceive immigration and terrorism as routine policy 
challenges best dealt with through normal law enforcement and politi-
cal channels or, alternatively, crisis policy areas requiring the formula-
tion and execution of extreme measures.44 According to Karyotis, the 
“tendency to report migration news from the perspective of dominant 
political actors, such as the government and the police,” routinely re-
sults in the media playing a critical role in popularizing the security 
rhetoric of elites.45 In the Greek case he observes that
the media adopted mostly nationalistic standpoints [in response to mass immi-
gration], with shallow, xenophobic representations of migration. These included 
publishing misleading newspaper headlines, which attributed criminal acts to 
migrants, despite the lack of evidence. Furthermore, any crimes committed by 
foreigners received prime-time coverage, complete with ominous music, re- 
enactments and special effects.46
41 McLaren 2008, 15.
42 Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007, xii.
43 See Croft 2012, 209–17; and Norris, Kern, and Just 2003, 296.
44 Triandafyllidou 1999.
45 Karyotis 2011b, 10.
46 Karyotis 2011b, 10.
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In the case of Italy, Triandafyllidou argues similarly that the discourse 
on immigration in the press routinely reproduces national identity di-
mensions in ways that emphasize the differences between “Italians and 
immigrants and re-define the conception of the Italian nation along 
exclusionary lines.”47
 How well and to what extent does the media’s coverage of immigra-
tion-related issues reflect the purported securitization agenda of elites? 
Tsoukala reports in her chapter in Security, Insecurity and Migration in 
Europe that the representation of asylum seekers and immigrants in 
the French and Greek media during the 1980s and 1990s “repeatedly 
highlighted the prevalence of negative stereotypes” (p. 182). She further 
argues that the media’s coverage of immigration reflexively echoed the 
policy agendas of political elites and that it subsequently adapted its 
coverage whenever the elite agendas changed. Specifically, as France 
and Greece moved closer to the late 2000s—that is, after September 
11—their respective media’s representation of asylum seekers and im-
migrants shifted in a manner that reflected the “strict rational criteria 
that incorporate[d] [the] vested interests and needs of the host society” 
(p. 192). In response to the then unfavorable demographic and struc-
tural changes occurring within the domestic labor market and in order 
“to protect certain domestic interests that are consensually accepted 
as vital for the well-being of [the] host societies,” the press in each 
country eventually discarded its previously prevailing discourse framing 
immigrants as an economic and a demographic threat but nonethe-
less continued to reproduce the “image of ‘foreigner’ as a source of key 
social threats, thereby fueling widespread fear and anxiety over security 
and identity related issues” (p. 192). As a result of the aforementioned 
shift, according to Tsoukala, there is now a duality of press discourses 
within France and Greece: desecuritizing discourse (that is, discourse 
promoting some streams of immigration as economically useful) and 
securitizing discourse (that is, discourse suggesting that most immi-
grants continue to threaten to the dominant sociocultural order).48
Bourbeau’s more persuasive answer to the question of whether the 
media’s coverage of immigration issues reflects the securitization agenda 
of elites sharply dissents from Tsoukala’s, however, and in so doing casts 
serious doubt on the media’s purported role as a unitary and significant 
securitizing agent. His content analysis of nearly nine hundred newspa-
per editorials in Canada and France between 1989 and 2005 found little 
47 Triandafyllidou 1999, 67.
48 Tsoukala 2011, 192.
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empirical evidence that the media are important securitizing agents in 
the two major countries of immigration. Rather,
Canada’s biggest national newspaper, The Globe and Mail, made securitiza-
tion moves only following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Can-
ada’s biggest francophone newspaper, La Presse, made almost no securitizing 
moves throughout the years. . . . Similarly, editorialists of France’s newspaper Le 
Monde have not argued for the securitization of migration for the entire period 
this study covers. Finally, editorialists of Le Figaro are the only ones who have 
made several securitizing moves in a forceful and repeated way. (p. 96)
If Bourbeau’s results can be replicated in other country cases, then it is 
reasonable to conclude that the media’s response to precipitating focus-
ing events does not automatically follow or necessarily reflect the secu-
ritizing cues of political elites. At the very least his findings suggest that 
while the media can be a securitizing agent, its potential to be so is ir-
regular and, ultimately, its coverage of immigration-related issues sheds 
little, if any, useful light on the larger securitization process (p. 96).
possible evolution of public policy
As mentioned previously, many if not most securitization of immigra-
tion scholars concur that immigration-related public policies have be-
come more illiberal in the contemporary age of terror. However, among 
these scholars there is less agreement on whether or not September 
11 and other, related terrorist events have precipitated a significant de-
parture from the immigration policy status quo. Put in the form of a 
question: have the aforementioned events redirected the trajectory of 
contemporary immigration-related policies?
In contrast to the tenuous claim that Western political elites have 
conducted a series of calculated and sustained rhetorical campaigns to 
convince the general public that immigrants constitute an omnipresent 
and urgent security threat, the assertion that state immigrant and im-
migration policies have become more illiberal after September 11 and 
subsequent terrorist-related events in Europe is supported by abundant 
evidence.49 Of the works reviewed here Chebel d’Appollonia’s Frontiers 
of Fear provides the most comparative and comprehensive coverage of 
how states have reconfigured their immigration-related policies in the 
contemporary age of terror. Its third chapter in particular exhaustively 
details the numerous “security packages” and “exceptional measures” 
49 Diez and Squire 2008; Frederking 2012; and Haubrich 2003.
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that American and European governments adopted to enhance home-
land security after September 11, including their implementation of 
a “zero-tolerance approach to immigration offenses, tougher controls 
on borders, and even extraterritorial controls beyond borders” (p. 77). 
Chebel d’Appollonia is hardly alone in documenting the insular and ex-
clusionary trajectory of post–September 11 immigration and immigrant 
policy. On the respective policy fronts of protecting asylum seekers and 
refugees (chapters by Brown and Bean, Salehyan, and Thielemann), 
securing national borders (chapter by Mitsilegas), and implementing 
domestic immigration and immigrant rights policies (chapters by Jupp, 
Luedtke, and Waslin), virtually all of the contributors to Immigration 
Policy and Security concur that public policy has become more illiberal 
in the contemporary age of terror. Although the most onerous effects of 
this trend seem to have been visited upon immigrants and/or prospec-
tive migrants, as Salehyan helpfully and somewhat surprisingly points 
out in his chapter, it has not especially discriminated against Muslims.
The scholarly consensus on the negative policy fallout of September 
11 and subsequent terrorist events in Britain, France, the Netherlands, 
Spain, the US, and elsewhere extends deeper. Most scholars also agree 
that the changes directly linked to the securitization of immigration 
have precipitated general policy failure. Thus, in the contemporary age 
of terror new or reconfigured public policies have eroded general civil 
liberties (Mitsilegas); circumscribed immigrant rights (Hampshire); 
damaged the national macroeconomic interest (Brown and Bean); re-
tarded the progress of European integration (Luedtke); and, according 
to Chebel d’Appollonia (2012, 249), severely compromised national 
security and even imperiled democracy itself. In his contribution to 
Security, Insecurity and Migration in Europe, Karyotis (p. 22) cites three 
specific ways in which securitizing immigration has been a “counter-
productive management strategy.” First, securitization “as a response 
to perceived threats to the identity of the host nation” has paradoxi-
cally persuaded many productive economic migrants to return to their 
country of origin and inspired others, contrary to the preferences of 
policymakers, to settle permanently in order to secure their continued 
access to the domestic labor market. Second, securitizing immigration 
has increased the risk of public disorder by reproducing a “criminal-
migrant discourse” and, in so doing, poisoned immigrant-native citi-
zen relations. Finally, “justifying restrictive policies with reference to 
the threat of terrorism . . . has [had] the unfortunate effect of blurring 
all types of migrants and incorporating illegal migrants, labor immi-
grants and asylum-seekers into a single policing-repression scheme.” 
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As Chebel d’Appollonia concisely summarizes the consensus on policy 
failure among securitization of immigration scholars: “The securitiza-
tion of immigration has proven ineffective in achieving its prescribed 
goals” and “worse . . . the policies that have been introduced have ag-
gravated the problem that they were supposed to address” (p. 5).
Somewhat curiously and importantly for assessing the value of ap-
plying securitization theory to the phenomenon of immigration, there 
is a third point on which most scholars concur—that the securitization 
of immigration and immigrant policy long predates September 11 and 
the so-called war on terror. Karyotis, for example, argues that the recent 
focusing events that inspired securitization did not precipitate “the in-
securities, uncertainties, ambiguities, and complexities that characterize 
migration policies at both the domestic and European level . . . [but] 
rather they strengthened and legitimized the security logic that has 
dominated asylum and immigration policies in Europe since the late 
1970s.”50 Moreover, according to Chebel d’Appollonia:
Neither the United States nor European countries dramatically changed their 
policy options in the aftermath of 9/11. Rather, they simply strengthened ex-
isting measures or implemented reforms. Interestingly, the “new” threats were 
not perceived as an incentive for policy innovation, but rather as the posteriori 
legitimization of previous, failed policies. (p. 7)
In his chapter in Security, Insecurity and Migration in Europe, Nag-
tegaal too concurs that the conflation of security with immigration is an 
“old phenomenon,” provocatively arguing that “the way states deal with 
refugees in the first decade of the twenty-first century does not deviate 
from refugee policies executed since the early twentieth century” (p. 119).
 Assuming that post–September 11 state immigrant and immigration 
policies are indeed less liberal than previously and/or are counterpro-
ductive, to what extent have state immigration-related policies been 
transformed? To what extent do they represent a radical departure from 
the policy status quo?
According to Boswell, “while there may be some evidence that se-
curitization has occurred in a number of cases . . . there is no reason 
to expect politics to be driven exclusively by an interest in encourag-
ing public unease or introducing more stringent security measures.”51 
Indeed, she offers three fairly persuasive reasons for why states and 
political parties of government would normally be circumspect about 
promoting securitization:
50 Karyotis 2011a, 13.
51 Boswell 2007, 592.
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The first reason . . . is that securitization can create unfeasible [public] expecta-
tions about the state’s capacity to control migration. By depicting migration 
policy as part of a counterterrorism strategy, states are effectively raising the 
stakes of migration control. If they fail to deliver on targets of migration control, 
they expose themselves to quite serious accusations about their capacity to pro-
vide security. . . . Pursuing a strategy of securitization may also jeopardize other 
goals of the state, such as ensuring a sufficient supply of migrant labor to guar-
antee the conditions of economic growth. . . . The third reason why European 
states appear to have resisted the securitization of migration control relates to 
the cognitive constraints. . . . Governments need to offer coherent and credible 
accounts of the causes and nature of the terrorist threat and the sorts of inter-
ventions that can best respond to them.52
Boswell specifically observes that while many European governments 
were highly motivated to reduce irregular immigration during the early 
2000s, several were also simultaneously making concerted efforts to 
bolster public support for implementing expansive labor migration 
policies, therefore diminishing any incentives they may have had to 
securitize immigration. In echoing Freeman’s theory of client politics, 
Boswell suggests that political elites, and particularly those in govern-
ment, by default are adverse to securitizing immigration for fear of 
compromising the flow of migrant labor that is so crucial to the inter-
ests of a subset of their national business community.53
Indeed, the elevation of immigration to the status of a metaissue 
within the immigration-receiving countries, whatever its precipitating 
cause or causes, only seems to further destabilize a policy equilibrium 
that, until recently, prevailed across Europe and the US and one to 
which mainstream political elites and political parties have traditionally 
adhered and, presumably for self-interested reasons, wish to preserve.54 
Founded upon the premise that each of the three dimensions of con-
temporary immigration policy—labor immigration policy, immigrant 
incorporation policy, and border control policy—could be formulated 
in relative isolation and far from public scrutiny, elites could make 
decisions taken along one policy dimension of immigration without 
circumscribing decisions made along other dimensions. Contrary to a 
central core supposition of securitization theory, it could be reason-
ably argued that as a consequence of September 11 and other terrorist- 
related events, the platform on which elites craft and implement im-
migration and immigrant policy has now become more rather than less 
politically contested and politicized. Moreover, elite policy-making 
52 Boswell 2009, 102–3.
53 Freeman 1995; Boswell 2009, 102.
54 Boswell 2009, 102.
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prerogatives may also have become more circumscribed. With regard to 
the former point, Roe persuasively argues that “in the context of liberal 
democracies, legislation is invariably marked by a greater semblance of 
oversight” than is typically assumed by securitization scholars; more-
over, “the extent to which securitization necessitates a lack of open-
ness and deliberation has been exaggerated.”55 With regard to the lat-
ter possibility, Freeman, Givens, and Leal helpfully underscore the fact 
that “the attack on the Twin Towers clearly derailed what would almost 
certainly have been a major expansion and liberalization of American 
immigration law that the Bush administration had promised President 
Vincente Fox of Mexico” (p. 3).
scrutinizing the securitization of immigration literature
In which ways then is contemporary immigration and immigrant policy 
securitized? Our above review of the collected works and other perti-
nent scholarship suggests that the securitization of immigration para-
digm rests on two fairly solid pillars. First, as observed earlier, some 
mainstream politicians and most extreme right political actors within 
the immigration-receiving countries unquestionably have rhetorically 
linked domestic terrorist-related incidents to immigration since Sep-
tember 11. As Freeman, Givens, and Leal note, “immigration every-
where has become a higher-priority item on the public agenda and 
everywhere it has come to be linked to possibilities of terrorist attacks” 
(p. 9). Boswell similarly observes that the “terrorist attacks on the U.S. 
and the subsequent bombings in Madrid and London provided an op-
portunity for governments, politicians, and the media to correlate ter-
rorism with immigration.”56
 Nevertheless, this pillar has at least two conspicuous cracks. The first 
problem springs from the tendency of securitization of immigration 
scholars to impute the motives for so-called elite securitizing moves. 
The suppositions that Western politicians have adopted rhetorical dis-
courses that frame immigrants as an existential, material, and/or physi-
cal threat for self-serving political reasons and/or in order to enhance 
the legitimacy of their privileged position have not been adequately 
documented within the securitization of immigration literature. Few 
securitization of immigration scholars have provided, either through 
elite interviews or other data-collection methods, empirical evidence 
concerning the motives that purportedly inspire elite securitization 
55 Roe 2012, 250.
56 Boswell 2009, 93.
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moves and, instead, have repeatedly resorted to argument by assertion. 
Along these lines it is necessary to document that political elites act 
purposefully whenever they rhetorically link immigration to security, 
since in the absence of such evidence a central tenet of securitization 
theory—that is, focusing events inspire strategically motivated elite se-
curitizing speech acts—remains unproven.
Yet another problem with the aforementioned perspective is the 
reality that elite securitizing speech is not an especially recent phe-
nomenon. As almost all securitization of immigration scholars read-
ily acknowledge, numerous examples of elite securitization discourse 
are liberally sprinkled across the past four decades, if not even farther 
back in time. For securitization theory this fact raises awkward and 
unanswered questions concerning what is ultimately “normal” and “ex-
traordinary” securitizing speech, an important boundary that, insofar 
as it exists, signals if and when an elite campaign has been launched to 
transfer immigration-related issues from the realm of normal to that of 
emergency politics.57 For example, if elite securitizing speech is more 
or less a constant feature while securitizing measures on matters of im-
migration vary within the immigration-receiving countries, then how 
can we be confident that the former is a necessary and strategically in-
spired prelude to the latter? Similarly, if elite securitizing speech is not 
especially new in the long history of mass migration to Europe and the 
United States, then when and how is it directly connected to recently in-
spired strategies to formulate and implement “extraordinary measures” 
on immigration-related questions?
A second pillar of the securitization of immigration literature is that 
September 11 and subsequent terrorist events in Europe have precipi-
tated numerous changes and/or revisions in state immigrant and im-
migration policies. The claim that contemporary state immigrant and 
immigration policies are now more exclusionary since September 11 
and subsequent terrorist-related events in Europe is well documented. 
This said, to the degree that policy continuity rather than discontinu-
ity on immigration generally prevails across the immigration-receiving 
countries since September 11—that is, post–September 11 terrorist 
events have accelerated but did not spark the recent illiberal turn in 
immigrant and immigration policy—then the assumption of many se-
curitization theorists that political elites have gained greater policy-
making autonomy as a result of domestic acts of terrorism is thrown 
into doubt.58 In short, if the immigration-receiving countries have not 
57 Roe 2012, 25.
58 Bourbeau 2011, 134.
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significantly altered their policies in the aftermath of terrorist acts but, 
rather, have “simply strengthened existing measures or implemented 
reforms,”59 then why do we need securitization theory to explain the 
latter phenomenon?
With regard to the public’s role in the securitization process, the 
opinion survey evidence, as we have seen above, generally does not sup-
port the assumptions of securitization theory. Although numerous citi-
zens within the affected countries are undoubtedly insecure about the 
presence of immigrants, several studies convincingly demonstrate that 
contentious issues pertaining to the presence of immigrants were already 
“securitized” for many if not most of the public within the immigration- 
receiving countries well before September 11 and other recent acts of 
domestic terrorism; that is, a substantial percentage of the public al-
ready perceived immigrants as negatively impacting employment, na-
tional culture/identity, and/or physical safety. Especially problematic 
for securitization theory and its claim that elites rhetorically framed a 
“convenient linkage” between national security and immigration after 
September 11—which has been received, comprehended, and broadly 
embraced by the public—is the fact that there is scant evidence of 
change in the opinion survey data over time. Rather, if anything, the 
survey evidence demonstrates the very opposite—that elite securitiza-
tion moves after September 11 appear to have had little if any influence 
on public opinion, especially over the medium to long term. If Sep-
tember 11 and subsequent terrorist-related events did not precipitate 
or expand the public’s insecurities about immigration and immigrants, 
then what ultimately does securitization theory usefully explain?
Finally, it is also problematic for securitization theory that the me-
dia’s role in the process of securitizing immigration is, at best, ambigu-
ous and, at worst, insignificant. The paucity of concrete evidence for 
the view that the media reflexively echo the securitizing cues of politi-
cal elites raises doubts about the veracity of the claim that they play a 
critical role in facilitating communication between securitizing agents 
and their target mass audience and, in so doing, “popularize” the for-
mer’s security rhetoric. It is, of course, undeniable that the mass media 
frequently frame immigrants as a security threat.60 Moreover, the pos-
sibility that whenever the media link terrorist events to immigration 
and immigrant settlement, the securitization agenda of at least some 
elites, and especially anti-immigrant political actors, is reinforced and 
to some extent legitimized cannot be easily dismissed. Nevertheless, in 
59 Chebel d’Appollonia 2012, 7.
60 See, for example, Oates 2006.
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the absence of hard evidence that the media’s immigration frames in-
fluence more of the public to become illiberal and/or insecure—rather 
than simply making public discourse on immigration-related issues 
uncivil—it is safer than not to conclude that the media’s role in the 
securitization process is more modest than many securitization of im-
migration scholars typically claim.
conclusions: securitizing immigration?
According to Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, securitization scholars are 
dedicated to discovering “who securitizes (securitizing actor), on what 
issues (threats), for whom (referent object), why, with what results, and 
not least, under what conditions.”61 Given these ambitions, how much 
light does the securitization paradigm ultimately shed on the post–Sep-
tember 11 politics of immigration? This question cannot be satisfacto-
rily addressed, let alone comprehensively answered, until securitization 
of immigration scholars first undertake a hitherto neglected task: that 
is, segregate the numerous public policies that have been spawned and 
justified primarily by the so-called war on terror from those that have 
purportedly been crafted to advance an anti-immigrant/immigration 
agenda. Along these lines the uncontestable fact that Western govern-
ments have adopted numerous “security packages” and “exceptional 
measures” in responding to real or imagined terrorist threats, acts that 
in turn have imposed significant burdens on immigrants or would-be 
migrants, does not, of itself, constitute objective evidence of securitiza-
tion. Rather, following the logic of the Copenhagen School, in order 
for securitization to occur, elite discourse must conflate immigration 
with terrorism and deliberately exploit the public’s fear of immigrants 
for the strategic purpose of transferring the affected issue(s) out of the 
realms of conventional politics and policy-making and into the domain 
of emergency politics.62
 As measured against this standard, it is far from clear that all of the 
aforementioned links in the securitization chain are equally strong or 
even exist with respect to immigration. As we’ve argued above, there is 
little evidence that mainstream political elites have conducted a series 
of deliberate and sustained campaigns to convince the general public 
that immigrants constitute an omnipresent security menace. More-
over, there is a paucity of evidence that connects illiberal elite speech— 
either before or after September 11—to the explicit motive of wishing 
61 Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, 32.
62 Boswell 2009, 93.
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to transfer immigration-related issues to the realm of emergency poli-
tics. Similarly, there are no longitudinal public opinion surveys indicat-
ing that elite securitizing speech acts have swelled the ranks of citizens 
who view immigrants as an economic, sociocultural, and/or physical 
safety threat. Indeed, there is no support for the supposition that elites 
have rhetorically framed a “convenient linkage” between national se-
curity and immigration that, in turn, has been widely embraced by the 
public in the affected countries. Moreover, if Bourbeau’s findings from 
the Canadian and French cases are eventually replicated in other coun-
try contexts, then the mass media’s coverage of precipitating focusing 
events appears to be uneven across national settings, and, in any event 
and more importantly, it does not reflexively echo the purported secu-
ritization agenda of political elites.
 Instead, the paucity of empirical evidence to support the securitiza-
tion paradigm as it has been applied to immigration appears to validate 
Boswell’s view that reports of immigration being securitized either be-
fore or after September 11 may very well be exaggerated. This said, to 
the extent that immigration-related issues are now included in a new 
“security continuum”63 within the immigration-receiving countries, two 
negative, pre–September 11 trends have in turn become more deeply 
embedded and, despite the aforementioned shortcomings of securitiza-
tion theory, justify that scholars continue to focus on the security im-
plications of contemporary immigration. First, immigration has been 
reinforced in the popular mind as a phenomenon that imperils the qual-
ity of life.64 Along these lines, it is especially troubling and politically 
pertinent that more than half of all citizens within nineteen European 
Union countries view ethnic minorities as posing some level of cultural 
and/or economic threat.65 Second, the immigration-security nexus un-
doubtedly reinforces the public’s long-standing reservations about the 
wisdom of the original decision of post-WWII governments to permit 
permanent mass immigrant settlement and, in its wake, the multicul-
turalization of their respective societies.66 However, unlike its earliest 
detractors, many of the contemporary critics of mass immigrant settle-
ment are not xenophobes, overt racists, or petty nationalists. Rather, 
their central concern is that the immigration-receiving societies have 
now become too diverse to sustain the mutual obligations that underpin 
a secure society and a generous welfare state; that is, mass immigrant 
63 Aradau 2001; Bigo 2002; Furuseth 2003: 40; Huysmans 2006.
64 Alexseev 2005, 66–67; Huysmans 2000, 752; Tsoukala 2005.
65 Ederveen et al. 2004, 82.
66 Feldblum 1999; Freeman 1997; Leiken 2005; Rubin and Verheul 2009.
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settlement has created a precarious trade-off between national social 
solidarity and ethnic and cultural diversity.67 Although this concern has 
been summarily dismissed in the empirical work of numerous Ameri-
can and European scholars, 68 the ongoing potential of immigration to 
feed currents of popular insecurity nevertheless underscores its political 
salience within and across the immigration-receiving countries. As a 
result, the major challenge for scholars of contemporary immigration 
going forward is to gain and share important insights into the afore-
mentioned currents without either overestimating their importance or 
misrepresenting the larger objective realities within which they are em-
bedded.
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